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Serving a Lawless President
Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself.
Jean-Paul Sartre
by William R. Casto *
I. INTRODUCTION
What does an Attorney General do when confronted with a lawless
President? At first glance, the answer is easy,1 but on second thought, a
realistic answer is complicated. The answer is complicated because the
phrase “lawless president” is not necessarily pejorative. In fact, western
leaders have always exercised a prerogative power to throw the law
overboard when they see fit.2 Some of our greatest Presidents have
followed this path. Thomas Jefferson did,3 as did Abraham Lincoln4 and
Franklin Roosevelt.5
So what does the President’s Attorney General do? The law and
principles of professional responsibility offer a clear answer to the
question whether an attorney should conspire with the President to act
unlawfully. The short and simple answer is “no.”6 If we seek more
nuanced guidance than this procrustean solution, we must look beyond
Paul Whitfield Horn Distinguished Professor, Texas Tech University.
One is reminded of the old professional-responsibility joke that the answer to any
legal ethics problem is, “I would not take that case, or I would not take that client.”
2
See generally EXTRA-LEGAL POWER AND LEGITIMACY: PERSPECTIVES AND
PREROGATIVE (Clement Fatovic & Benjamin Kleinerman eds., 2013).
3 See notes 38–45, infra and accompanying text.
4 See notes 34–35, infra and accompanying text.
5 See notes 87–154, infra and accompanying text.
6 At least attorneys are not to assist in the commission of a crime. Paul Tremblay, At
Your Service: Lawyer Discretion to Assist Clients in Unlawful Conduct, 70 FLA. L. REV.
251 (2018). The escape valve of prosecutorial discretion may allow authorities not to
charge clear transgressions. See KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY
348–59 (1987). On three occasions, Attorney General Robert Jackson conspired with
President Roosevelt to commit crimes. See notes 91–154, infra and accompanying text.
Two of these criminal acts involved very specific statutory crimes. The third, which
involved the unlawful sale of destroyers to Great Britain, was a criminal theft of
government property.
*
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the law and beyond the principles of professional responsibility. A
lawless official must seek guidance in extra-legal—hopefully moral—
principles.
This existentialist essay7 ignores the question of what an attorney
should do. To be sure, one could ruminate on the issue,8 but that is not
the path here taken. Instead, the essay describes how one capable and
honorable Attorney General actually dealt with the problem. The
exploration concentrates on the “is” (was) and not the “ought.” This
approach accords with the wisdom of an experienced and thoughtful
observer of public life: “It seems better to me to go straight to the actual
truth of things rather than to dwell in dreams.”9
In thinking about an attorney’s service to a lawless President, a
clear distinction must be drawn between advising the President about
the law and assisting the President in implementing a program. A
number of serious thinkers have carefully analyzed the role of
government attorneys in facilitating government lawlessness, but their
attention has been focused on the attorneys’ advice rather than
participation in a criminal conspiracy.10 There are clear and easily
understood principles regarding legal advice that the attorney may
properly give and so long as the advice is reasonably accurate, there
should be no problem.11 In contrast to legal advice, an attorney who
helps implement an illegal program is herself lawless—she has become
her President’s co-conspirator. She is in the clutches of what Michael
Walzer has described as “The Problem of Dirty Hands.”12
Although this existentialist essay eschews the issue of how an
Attorney General should act, the purpose is not to provide a free moral
pass. An attorney who assists the President to implement an illegal
project is morally complicit in the President’s action and may be subject
to moral condemnation. But it is complicated. Sometimes the action,

7 The essay is existentialist but not nihilist. See notes 18 & 170–79, infra and
accompanying text.
8 For a valiant effort suggesting a bewildering array of relevant factors, see Louis
Seidman, Powell’s Choice: The Law and Morality of Speech, Silence, and Resignation by
High Government Officials (2008) (draft).
9 MILES J. UNGER, MACHIAVELLI: A BIOGRAPHY 215 (2011) (translating Niccolo
Machiavelli, The Prince Ch. XV).
10 See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, TORTURE, POWER, AND LAW Ch. 8 (2014);
W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers and Fidelity to Law 177–84 (2010).
11 See WILLIAM R. CASTO, ADVISING THE PRESIDENT: ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT H.
JACKSON AND FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (2018). See also notes
83–86, infra and accompanying text.
12 Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 Philosophy & Pub.
Aff. 160 (1973). See CASTO, supra note 11, at 146–48.
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though illegal, is the right thing to do. For example, in 1940 Great
Britain stood alone against the Nazi Colossus, and President Franklin
Roosevelt, with his Attorney General’s assistance, illegally sold 50
obsolescent destroyers to the British.13 The President and his Attorney
General conspired to violate the law, but should they be morally
condemned? Surely, the answer is no.
How does a particular Attorney General determine whether to
facilitate Presidential lawlessness? Stuart Hampshire has persuasively
argued that this difficult question cannot be answered through rational
analysis.14 To be sure, there are a number of factors relevant to the
question. Respect for the rule of law is at the head of the list and in
almost all cases, will influence a President and Attorney General to act
lawfully. In a small number of situations, however, other considerations
may outweigh respect for the law.15 Weighing and balancing these
considerations is not a rational process.
Based upon decades of experience in government, Lieutenant
General Charles Pede16 has provided advice that should make sense to
practicing lawyers. He asks, “[H]ow do you know what the right thing
is?”17 He replies, “[Y]ou trust your gut. You talk with your trusted
friend, perhaps you pray, you ‘let things cook’ for a while, but deep
down, trust me, you’ll know. It wells up in your gut and your gut tells
you.”18 His advice based upon a lifetime of professional experience is a
practical application of Hampshire’s persuasive theoretical analysis. In
giving this advice, General Pede was not addressing the difficult issue
of conspiring to commit a crime.
Robert H. Jackson was the Attorney General who conspired to assist
the British in their hour of desperate need, and his career illustrates
approaches or tactics for dealing with a lawless President.19 He is
almost universally respected as a capable and honorable public

See notes 116–41, infra and accompanying text.
Stuart Hampshire, Public and Private Morality, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY
23–53 (S. Hampshire ed. 1978).
15 There is the matter of duty to the public, including weighing and balancing the
consequences of following the law or not. Likewise, the attorney general will certainly
consider a particular president’s entitlement to respect, loyalty, and gratitude. There also
are unsavory factors that come into play. Factors like self-aggrandizement, careerism,
prestige, and a desire for future employment.
16 General Pede is the Army’s leading lawyer, its Judge Advocate General.
17 Charles Pede, Remarks on Being a Good Lawyer, 52 TEX. TECH. L. R. 837, 843
(2020).
18 Id.
19 See CASTO, supra note 11.
13
14
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servant.20 More than once, Jackson had to deal with President
Roosevelt’s desire to cast the law aside.
The present essay draws upon H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law to
develop a model for thinking about Jackson’s service to his President.21
Then the essay notes a few specific historical occasions in which
western leaders have acted lawlessly.22 After that, we turn to details of
Jackson’s service as a praxis for understanding the plight of an
Attorney General serving a lawless President. Finally, the essay
concludes by emphasizing the value and importance of passing moral
judgment on the actions of an Attorney General.
II. THE CONCEPT OF LAW
A little over fifty years ago, H.L.A. Hart wrote “the most influential
book in legal philosophy ever written in English.”23 In The Concept of
Law,24 Hart, who was a legal positivist, constructed a general theory of
what laws are. In particular and for the purpose of the present essay,
he believed that any legal system had to have rules of recognition that
are used to determine whether a particular rule is or is not a valid law.
In the United States, these rules of recognition are laid out in our state
and federal Constitutions. Hart believed that there is no necessary
relationship between law and morality. He did recognize, however, that
as a matter of local policy, some countries might choose to incorporate
moral requirements in their rules of recognition.25 A law that is duly
created pursuant to the applicable rules of recognition is a valid law
regardless of its morality. Rules that are “morally iniquitous”
nevertheless are laws so long as they meet the test of a particular
country’s rules of recognition.26
Because Hart developed his concept in the aftermath of World War
II, he inevitably had to consider the monstrosity of Nazi Germany. True
to his concept, he insisted that the Nazi legal grotesqueries clearly were
laws because they came from law makers constitutionally empowered to
make them. They satisfied Germany’s rules of recognition. At the same
time, he believed that laws need not be followed merely because they

20 See, e.g., George Garre, On lawyers and leadership in government: lessons from
“American’s advocate”, Robert H. Jackson, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1795 (2017); Warner Gardner,
Government Attorney, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 438 (1955).
21 See notes 23–31, infra and accompanying text.
22 See notes 34–46, infra and accompanying text
23 HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW at xi (3d ed. 2012).
24 HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (3d ed. 2012).
25 Id. at 247 (postscript).
26 Id. at 206.
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are laws. In his view, “[W]e should say, ‘[t]his is law; but it is too
iniquitous to be applied or obeyed.’”27 Some argued that grossly immoral
laws are not laws at all, but Hart rejected this approach.28 Instead of
including morality in his general definition of law, he believed that
separating the two concepts allowed for a more careful analysis of the
problem of iniquitous laws. For example, how should we treat someone
who has complied with, taken advantage of, or relied upon an evil law?
They may well have acted immorally, but should we retroactively
punish them for an action that was lawful at the time that it was
taken?29 In Hart’s mind, retroactive—ex post facto—punishment for
some of the Nazis’ outrages was appropriate.30
Hart was also concerned with officials that are called upon to
enforce laws. He specifically addressed “[T]he unfortunate
official . . . who was called on to apply [‘morally iniquitous’ laws].”31 The
question for the unfortunate official was whether the laws are too
iniquitous to be applied. Hart clearly rejected the notion that a law is
an absolute mandate that an official must follow at all cost. In his mind,
“[T]here is something outside the official system, by reference to which
in the last resort the individual must solve his problems of obedience [to
law].”32
A. Presidential Prerogative
Hart and others have addressed the problem of laws that are
iniquitous in and of themselves.33 His concept, however, needs further
elaboration. Suppose that, unlike the Nazi laws, a particular law is
innocuous on its face and has been enacted to further a reasonable
purpose. Suppose also that this law forbids particular official action
that is necessary to avert a calamitous event. In such a case, many
conscientious western leaders have believed—to use Hart’s words—that
Id. at 208. Accord, GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 279 (Nazi laws).
Hart and Lon Fuller debated this issue in H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); Lon Fuller, Positivism and
Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV, L. REV. 630 (1958).
29 See HART, supra note 23, at 210–12.
30 Hart, Positivism and Separation at 619.
31 HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW at (3d ed. 2012).
32 See HART, supra note 23, at 210. For a powerful, detailed, and convincing proof of
this idea, See GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at Ch. 4–8. Unfortunately, Professor
Greenawalt’s book deals primarily with the issue of civil disobedience and therefore is not
a perfect match for problems confronting a public official. Nevertheless, Greenawalt
provides a number of valuable insights to these problems.
33 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 293–344 (rev. ed. 1999); See WENDEL,
supra note 10, at 102–05.
27
28
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“there is something outside the official system, by reference to which in
the last resort,”34 they must turn to decide whether to obey the law.
Dilemmas like these are the stuff of presidential prerogative.
The idea that a leader sometimes should act lawlessly is centuries
old. The easiest example is an existential crisis. When a nation’s very
existence is at stake, self-preservation easily trumps legal
technicalities. Niccolo Machiavelli took Piero Soderini, gonfalonier of
the Republic of Florence, to task for Soderini’s failed defense of their
Republic. When the enemy was almost at the gates, Soderini refused to
violate the law and lost the Republic. Machiavelli believed that one
should never allow an evil to run out of respect for the law, especially
when the law itself might easily be destroyed by the evil.35 To be clear,
Machiavelli was not saying that in an emergency, a leader might
lawfully set aside applicable laws. Rather, he and others believed that
in some situations, a leader should act unlawfully.
At the beginning of our Civil War, Abraham Lincoln followed the
path that Machiavelli had marked. Congress was not in session and
Lincoln had to act. He did so in violation of the law. Lincoln explained,
“To state the question more directly, [a]re all the laws but one to go
unexecuted and the [g]overnment itself go to pieces lest that one be
violated[.]”36 In private, he told Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase, “I
will violate the Constitution, if necessary, to save the Union[.]”37
The same line of thought motivated Winston Churchill in Great
Britain’s death match with Nazi Germany. He willingly violated
international law because “We have a right, and, indeed, we are bound
in duty, to abrogate for a space some of the [c]onventions of the very law
we seek to consolidate and reaffirm.”38 A few years later and a year
before writing Animal Farm, George Orwell agreed: “When it is a

HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW at 210.
NICCOLE MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON THE FIRST DECADE OF TITUS LIVIUS, book 3,
ch.3 (1531). See also id. Ch. 41.
36 Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861. (emphasis
original). Lincoln continued, “Even in such a case, would not the official oath be broken, if
government should be overthrown, when it was believed that disregarding the single law,
could tend to preserve it.”
37
HAROLD BRUFF, UNTRODDEN GROUND: HOW PRESIDENTS INTERPRET THE
CONSTITUTION 120 (2015).
38 Winston Churchill, War Cabinet Memorandum, Dec. 16, 1939, reprinted in 1
CHURCHILL WAR PAPERS 522–24 (M. Gilbert ed., 1993). See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND
UNJUST WARS 242–50 (4th ed. 2006).
34
35

2021

SERVING A LAWLESS PRESIDENT

861

question of national existence, no government can stand on the letter of
the law[.]”39
Thomas Jefferson also preached this wisdom: “To lose our country
by a scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law
itself.”40 This idea is so obviously correct that its mere statement carries
the day.
B. The Outer Limits of Prerogative
When a leader faces an existential, national crisis, they clearly
should set aside the law to save the very existence of their republic. The
consequences of following the law (loss of the republic) are dwarfed by
the consequences of violating it (saving the republic). In the Concept of
Law, Hart (like Machiavelli, Lincoln, Jefferson, and Churchill)
addressed an extreme case—an easy case. Enforcing the Nazi legal
monstrosities is quite unacceptable.
The experiences of Soderini, Lincoln, and Churchill should not be
viewed as a rule applicable only to existential crises. Rather, their
experiences should be seen as obvious or easy cases. We may all agree
that laws should be broken if needed to save the republic. Determining
whether a crisis is existential, however, presents a difficult question.
Even in “easy” cases, there may be substantial disagreement regarding
whether there is an existential crisis.41
In the end, the matter inevitably turns on the President’s political
and moral judgment. Jefferson thoroughly understood that exercising
prerogative power places the President in a difficult position. The
“[L]ine of discrimination between cases may be difficult; but a good
officer is bound to draw it at his own peril & throw himself on the

39 George Orwell, As I Please, LONDON TRIBUNE, Oct. 27, 1944, reprinted in The
Collected Essays, Journalism, and Letters of George Orwell: As I Please, 263–65 (Sonia
Orwell ed. 1968).
Orwell was commending his country’s decision to lock up suspected Nazi sympathizers
like Sir Oswald Mosely without charge. For a highly critical treatment of the British
program by a highly respected historian, see A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, IN THE HIGHEST
DEGREE ODIOUS (1992). Thomas Jefferson believed that it might be proper for an
executive officer to deprive a traitor of his legal rights. Thomas Jefferson to John Colvin;
Thomas Jefferson to W.C.C. Clairborne.
40 Thomas Jefferson to John Colvin, Sept. 10, 1810. Accord, Thomas Jefferson to
Governor W.C.C. Clairborne, Feb. 3, 1807, reprinted in II THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 150–51 (A. Lipscomb ed., 1905). See BRUFF, supra note 37, at 70–72.
41 For example, when Roosevelt sold the fifty destroyers, the United States arguably
was not facing an existential crisis, and many Americans opposed the deal. See CASTO,
supra note 11, at 74.
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justice of his country and the rectitude of his motives.”42 This duty
places a president in a difficult position. Nevertheless, Jefferson
insisted that presidents are bound “to risk themselves on great
occasions, when the safety of the nation or some of its very high
interests are at stake.”43
What happens when the existence of the threat is not so clear, or the
political and moral stakes are not so high? What happens if it is not an
easy case?44 To clarify Hart’s concept: The Nazi laws’ primary iniquity
flowed from the consequences of actually enforcing them—not from
their mere existence.45 Presumably, Hart believed that an official
should weigh the consequences of enforcing the law against the
consequences of non-enforcement. In the context of the Nazi
monstrosities, weighing and balancing the consequences are easy.46 But
what if the imbalance of consequences is not so gross?
In 1810, Thomas Jefferson considered a hypothetical opportunity to
purchase “the Floridas” for a reasonable sum in the absence of a
Congressional appropriation of the purchase price.47 He further
hypothesized that Congress was not in session and that in any event
obstreperous Senators would delay things until the deal fell through.
Under the Constitution, no funds may be spent without a congressional
appropriation.48 In this situation, Jefferson believed that a president
should violate the Constitution.
Jefferson’s hypothetical clearly did not involve an existential crisis.
He believed that the president should throw the Constitution overboard
to get a good deal. For Jefferson, the limit to prerogative power was a
matter of presidential judgment. He believed, however, that the power
should not be exercised by “persons charged with petty duties, where
consequences are trifling, and time [is] allowed for a legal course.”49
Might a president violate the law as a matter of convenience? The
idea is disconcerting and should be placed in context. As a matter of
practice, many (most?; all?) of us act lawlessly when convenient. Think

Id.
Id.
44 Easy cases like the Nazi monstrosities are rare. See WENDEL, LAWYERS AND
FIDELITY at 117–18.
45 Of course, these laws’ mere existence was an official endorsement of evilness, and
these endorsements, in and of themselves, were despicable.
46 But see note 57, infra (the loyal Nazi).
47 See Jefferson, supra note 40 and accompanying text.
48 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. See also notes 102–05, infra and accompanying text.
49 Jefferson, supra note 38.
42
43
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of a rolling stop or exceeding the speed limit.50 The same goes for public
officials. For example, we are familiar with the passive/aggressive police
tactic of protesting some situation by meticulously complying with all
department rules and regulations to bring the effective performance of
duty to a grinding halt. The practice even has a name: rulebook
slowdown.51
Rulebook slowdowns only work because as a matter of convenience
and effective law enforcement, officers routinely disregard the lawful
rules and procedures of their departments.52 In the ordinary course of
duty, the officers are doing what we do when we speed—what Jefferson
recommended in acquiring the Floridas. They violate the law. We will
see that President Roosevelt, like his predecessors, felt no absolute duty
to abide by the law. The point of these hypothetical cases is simply to
recognize that lawlessness in our society is common. Our society may
punish these crimes, but frequently we do not.
To repeat, however, the present essay is not about whether
presidents and their attorneys general should follow the law. This essay
is concerned with the tactics that one Attorney General used to deal
with his lawless President.
III. JACKSON AND ROOSEVELT
Gratitude and loyalty were central to Jackson’s relationship with his
President. The two men had a passing relationship when Jackson first
came to Washington, but Jackson was grateful for his President’s
stewardship of the nation. Roosevelt saved us from the Great
Depression. By the time Jackson became Attorney General, Jackson
was quite grateful and quite loyal to his President. Roosevelt was his
“[H]ero, friend, and leader.”53 As Attorney General, Jackson viewed
himself as “[P]art of a team . . . and necessarily partisan.”54
When Jackson first came to Washington, he had only a casual
acquaintance with the President.55 In the beginning, gratitude played
50 See GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 243 n.33; William Simon, Authoritarian Legal
Ethics: Bradley Wendel and the Positivist Turn, 90 TEX. L. REV. 709, 720, 722–23 (2012).
51 See JEROME SKOLNICK & JAMES FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND EXCESSIVE USE
OF FORCE 120–21 (1994).
52 There may be very good reasons for the police to ignore applicable rules and
regulations regarding the performance of their duties. See GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at
356–67 (discussing “full enforcement” laws).
53ROBERT JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER’S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT xii
(2005).
54 JACKSON, REMINISCENCES 1102–03.
55 His first office was general counsel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. He obtained
the appointment through the recommendation of Herman Oliphant, general counsel of the
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the prominent role in the two men’s relationship. But not personal
gratitude. Rather, Jackson had a more general gratitude for Roosevelt’s
immense efforts to save the nation during the crisis of the Depression.
As Jackson steadily progressed upward in the Department of
Justice, his general gratitude expanded to include personal gratitude.
The President recognized Jackson’s abilities and rewarded him for
doing a good job. In 1938, Roosevelt appointed him Solicitor General.
Then two years later, Jackson became Attorney General, and finally in
1941 the President moved him to the Supreme Court.
Jackson was a staunch New Dealer who wanted to see society’s
benefits distributed more generally among his fellow citizens. The best
summary of his New-Deal philosophy appears in a 1935 letter to his
sixteen-year-old son. He described his work as involving “[T]he old fight
of those who have things well in their control against those who want
the benefits of civilization a little more widely distributed.”56 He had
seen the President rescue the nation from the Great Depression and
implement programs to distribute national resources more widely.
Jackson had great feelings of general and personal gratitude toward his
“hero.”
Gratitude is related to loyalty but is not the same thing.57 There is a
strong transactional undercurrent to gratitude. In exchange for what
you have given me, I will give you my gratitude. In contrast, loyalty is
more a matter of feeling: “Loyalty, like friendship, is the sort of thing
one grows into rather than decides to have.”58 There is no doubt that
over time, Jackson developed immense feelings of loyalty for his
President.
At loyalty’s core, the concept is amoral. For example, think of a loyal
Nazi.59 Albert Hirschman has established that loyalty plays an
important and valuable role in the operation of all organizations,
including the federal government.60 Hirshman was primarily an
economist, but his analysis fits a government organization tasked with
Treasury Department, and Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury. See GERHART,
AMERICA’S ADVOCATE at 64–65.
56 Robert Jackson to William (Bill) Jackson, Aug. 4, 1935, Jackson Papers, box 2, folder
5. A few years earlier, he said, “it is obvious that the contrast between our great collective
wealth and individual want indicates a bad distribution of the advantages of
industrialism.” Robert Jackson, speech delivered before the Labor Council of Jamestown,
NY, Oct. 21, 1931, Jackson papers, box 32, folder 6.
57 See R.E. Ewin, Loyalty and Virtues, 42 PHILOSOPHICAL Q. 403, 407–09 (1992).
58 Id. at 408.
59 See id. at 404, 418.
60 See ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
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delivering public goods. Instead of positing how people should act, he
developed a model explaining how exit, voice, and loyalty function in an
organization. Loyalty obviously contributes to cohesive operation. A
loyal member of an organization will implement a decision without
qualm even though the member may disagree with the decision.
Moreover, loyalty encourages the positive use of voice by members to
correct problems within an organization.61
Hirschman also analyzed how loyal members may give effect to their
disagreement with their organization’s decisions. A member may simply
exit or resign from the organization.62 More significantly, a loyal
member may give voice to her disagreement and attempt to modify or
forestall implementation of a bad decision. Hirschman persuasively
argues that a loyal member is more likely to exercise her voice
depending on (1) the tradeoff between making the problem go away by
resigning and the possibility that the organization could be improved
and (2) the extent to which she thinks she can influence the
organization.63
In fact, Jackson never resigned from the federal government, and
there is scant evidence that he ever seriously considered doing so.64
Because exit was not really an option, he was very likely to exercise
voice within government. More significantly, he knew that he had real
influence in molding government policies. In addition to influencing the
shape of official policy, he probably felt that exercising his voice was
intrinsically rewarding. It is personally gratifying to know that you
have done the right thing.65
President Roosevelt encouraged his advisers to speak out, and he
listened to them. Jackson was polite in his disagreements with the
President. Jesse Jones, who was a part of Roosevelt’s inner circle,
remembered that when Jackson “[W]as not in full agreement with the
President it was interesting to observe the finesse and polished courtesy
in his discussions.”66 Jones continued, Jackson “[W]as usually able to
avoid doing what he thought should not be done. I liked him very

Id. at 77–82.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY at 77 & Ch. 3. Jackson did not do so. See
notes 152–58, infra and accompanying text.
63 HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY at 77 & Ch. 3.
64 See notes 163–68, infra and accompanying text.
65 Albert Hirschman, “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty”: Further Reflections and Survey of
Recent Contributions, 58 MILBANK MEM. FUND. Q. HEALTH & SOC.
403, 433–36 (1980).
66 JESSE JONES & EDWARD ANGLY, FIFTY BILLION DOLLARS: MY THIRTEEN YEARS WITH
THE RFC (1932–1945) 307 (1951).
61
62
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much.”67 In 1952, Jackson, who was then on the Supreme Court, drew
upon his experience to advise a newly named Republican Attorney
General. “I congratulate you,” wrote Jackson, “upon being assigned to a
post of great legal power and even greater moral influence.”68
A decade earlier, Jackson had exercised great moral influence on a
number of non-legal issues. For example, he stopped Mayor Fiorello La
Guardia’s scheme to avoid a subway strike by federalizing the New
York subway system.69 Jackson also single handedly desegregated the
District of Columbia Bar Association’s Law Library.70
One of Jackson’s proudest exertions of moral influence was his
extensive campaign to protect immigrants.71 During World War I, the
widespread mistreatment of German Americans appalled Jackson,72
and he was determined to prevent a similar mistreatment of
immigrants in 1940–1941 while war was raging in Europe.73 He took
special pride in assuring that the Roosevelt Administration avoided the
mistakes from the prior war.74
Jackson attacked the problem of incipient nativism on all fronts. In
a private conversation over lunch, he warned the President, “[T]here
was somewhat the same tendency in America to make goats of all aliens
that in Germany had made goats of all Jews.”75 He firmly stated, “I am
utterly opposed to . . . persecuting or prosecuting aliens just because of
alienage.”76
He continued in the same vein at cabinet meetings and in private
discussions with cabinet members.77 Likewise, in more than twelve
public speeches and national radio broadcasts, he constantly reminded

Id.
Robert H. Jackson to Herbert Brownell, Jr., Nov. 24, 1952, Jackson Papers, box 9,
folder 12.
69 See CASTO, supra note 11, at 115–16. La Guardia’s scheme was lawful, but Jackson
said no.
70 Id. at 116–19.
71 Id. at 119–24.
72 He “could not forget his experience in the last war. As a young man he learned to
hate German baiting, which he saw run through the little town he lived in.” FRANCIS
BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 108 (1961).
73 See CASTO, supra note 11, at 119–24.
74 JACKSON, REMINISCENCES at 120–21.
75 Jackson, May 21, 1940 lunch, Jackson Papers, box 90, folder 6.
76 Id. On the Supreme Court, four years later, Jackson voted to hold the internment of
Japanese American citizens unconstitutional. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
242 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
77 See CASTO, supra note 11, at 122–23.
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the nation of the importance of treating aliens with respect and
dignity.78
In addition to moral suasion on policy issues, Jackson exerted
enormous influence on legal issues. He had a sophisticated
understanding of Roosevelt’s willingness to abide by the law. Like most
of us, the President’s default mode was to act lawfully. Jackson
explained that Roosevelt “[W]as of all men, one of the easiest to advise
on ordinary matters. If he was told that the statute did not permit
something, I never had difficulty with him. Even if he did not agree, he
would accept your view.”79 Jackson continued, “If he thought you were
loyal in your opposition, he listened to you. If he felt that someone was
being disloyal, then he was quite unforgiving.”80
In extraordinary situations, however, the law became just one of
many factors influencing the President’s decisions. If the stakes were
high enough, the President was willing to override the law and do what
he thought needed to be done.
Jackson knew that the President did not feel absolutely bound to
follow the law. In Jackson’s words, “[T]he [P]resident had a tendency to
think in terms of right and wrong, instead of legal and illegal. Because
he thought his motives were always good for the things that he wanted
to do, he found difficulty in thinking that there could be legal
limitations to them.”81 The President “was a strong skeptic of legal
reasoning.”82
After Jackson became a Justice, he hinted at his pragmatic view of
the President’s prerogative power during the Justices’ private
conference for the Steel Seizure Case.83 The Supreme Court of the
United States was reviewing President Truman’s order to seize the
nation’s steel industry during the Korean War. Jackson noted,
“President can throw Constitution overboard, but we can’t.”84 His words

Id.
JACKSON, REMINISCENCES at 917–18 (emphasis added).
80 Id. at 918.
81 See JACKSON, supra note 53, at 74.
82 Id. at 59. Similarly, Francis Biddle, who succeeded Jackson as attorney general,
remembered that the president “was never theoretical about things. What must be done
to defend the country must be done. . . . The Constitution has never greatly bothered any
wartime President.” See BRUFF, supra note 37, at 223 (quoting Biddle).
83 343 U.S. 579 (1952). The background of the Steel Seizure decision is ably presented
in MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL
POWER (rev. ed, 1994).
84 William O. Douglas, Conference Notes, May 16, 1962, William O. Douglas Papers,
box 221, folder 3, Library of Congress.
78
79
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were not simply a colloquial condemnation of Truman’s action. He
literally meant what he said.
Between 1940 and 1954, Jackson devoted careful and sustained
thought to the Civil War case of Ex parte Merryman.85 He wrote about
the case at least four times.86 In Merryman, Chief Justice Taney ruled
that President Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was
unconstitutional, but the President refused to comply with Taney’s
ruling. Jackson concluded that the President could throw the
Constitution overboard but that the Court could not. He believed, “Had
Mr. Lincoln scrupulously observed the Taney policy, I do not know
whether we would have any liberty[.]”87 At the same time, “[H]ad the
Chief Justice adopted Mr. Lincoln’s philosophy as the philosophy of the
law, I again do not know whether we would have had any liberty.”88
Consistent with this bipolar analysis, Jackson witnessed President
Roosevelt, his hero, friend, and leader, follow President Lincoln’s
lawless path on more than one occasion.
IV. SPECIFIC EPISODES
In considering how Jackson acted in response to specific episodes of
presidential lawlessness, we must draw a clear distinction between
Jackson’s private legal advice and what Jackson did after his President
reached a decision. In providing legal advice, Jackson was entirely loyal
to his President. As a loyal adviser, he strove to give his President a
realistic assessment of the law. He would tell Roosevelt “[W]hat his
chances were, what his risk was[.]”89 He believed that the “[B]est
quality in a lawyer’s advice is disinterestedness.”90 He continued, “[T]he
value of legal counsel is in the detachment of the adviser from the

17 F. Cas 144 (CC Md 1861).
ROBERT JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 321–27 (1941); Robert
Jackson, Draft Hirabayashi Opinion No. 870 (1943), reprinted in Dennis Hutchinson, “The
Achilles Heel” of the Constitution, 2002 SUP. CT REV. 455, 468–74 (2002); Robert Jackson,
Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law, 1 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 109 (1951); ROBERT
JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 76 (1962)
(published posthumously).
87 JACKSON, SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT at 76. Earlier,
Jackson had written, “I do not know that the ultimate cause of liberty has suffered, and it
may have been saved, by [Lincoln’s] questionable arrests.” Jackson’s, Draft Hirabayashi
Opinion at 474.
88 Id.
89 EUGENE GERHART, AMERICA’S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON 222 (1958) (quoting
Jackson).
90 H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF 86 (2014) (quoting
Jackson).
85
86

2021

SERVING A LAWLESS PRESIDENT

869

advised[.]”91 As a firm loyalist, he believed that the President needed a
clear understanding of the pertinent legal constraints. He would never
dupe his hero with inaccurate advice. When push came to shove, he
would frankly advise that a program under contemplation was illegal.
But once the President made up his mind, Jackson switched horses.
Jackson would then “support him as best I could.”92 In this situation,
Jackson’s best efforts included a willingness to assist in criminal
conduct.
When the President decided to throw the law overboard, he exercised
his prerogative power. When Jackson then conspired to assist in the
President’s unlawful program, he essentially rode on the President’s
coattails. Jackson deferred to the President’s lawlessness and became a
willing participant in the illegal, prerogative action. Both men were
morally responsible for their decision and should be subject to our moral
judgment. But not necessarily subject to our moral condemnation.
A. The Gold Clause Cases
The President’s tendency to think in terms of right and wrong
rather than lawful and unlawful emerged early in his presidency. He
was elected in the depths of the Great Depression, and he immediately
warned the country that to resolve the crisis “[I]t may be that an
unprecedented demand and need for undelayed action may call for
temporary departure from the normal balance of public procedure.”93
To remedy some of the hardships of the Depression, Roosevelt
pushed through a devaluation of the dollar, which would ease pressure
on the nation’s debtors.94 His controlled currency devaluation, however,
was not possible under a standard gold clause included in virtually all
debt contracts,95 so Roosevelt had Congress nullify all the gold clauses.
In response, the nation’s creditors challenged the nullification as
unconstitutional, and the litigation quickly reached the Supreme Court
in the Gold Clause Cases.96
Jackson, who was then general counsel of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, was already in Roosevelt’s inner circle. He knew that the

See JACKSON, supra note 53, at 60.
See GERHART, supra note 89, at 222 (quoting Jackson).
93 LOIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT
261 (3rd ed. 1991) (quoting Roosevelt).
94 See SEBASTIAN EDWARDS, AMERICAN DEFAULT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF FDR, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND THE BATTLE OVER GOLD 78 (2018).
95 See id. at 68–69.
96 Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio RR Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Nortz v. United States,
294 U.S. 330 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
91
92
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“President was greatly concerned about the [outcome of the Gold Clause
cases] and was quite determined that he just could not accept an
adverse decision.”97 The President told others that he had actually
drafted a radio speech to be given on the night of the day the court
handed down the decision.98 In the draft speech, the President planned
to tell the nation that he would not abide by the Court’s judgment.99
Fortunately, the Court ruled 5–4 in the President’s favor and averted
the looming constitutional crisis.
B. The National (now Reagan) Airport
In 1938, Jackson became Solicitor General and, in that capacity,
occasionally served as a pinch hitter for Attorney General Frank
Murphy. That fall, he represented Murphy at a cabinet meeting, and
the President was upset about the shortcomings of the capital’s airport,
which at that time was quite primitive. Jackson later remembered that
the national aerodrome was simply “[A] pasture intersected by a
highway. When a plane came in, they had to close the road to traffic
and open it again after the plane had landed.”100 He continued, “It was
dangerous, inadequate, and everyone regarded it as long behind the
times.”101
The President was “[P]retty much disgusted”102 with this ridiculous
situation. Congress had been working on the problem for over a decade
and could not get its act together. Two federal agencies had sufficient
funds to commence construction on a modern airport, but a technicality
in appropriations law barred use of the funds. The President told
Jackson, “I want you to get [with the agencies’ attorneys] at once and
knock their heads together until you get that money knocked out of
them.”103 Jackson did so and construction quickly commenced.
In Jackson’s words, “[W]ithout congressional authorization or
appropriation, the present Washington airport was begun.”104 This
action was criminal. Every attorney who has ever served the federal
government in a transactional role knows that the President and

See JACKSON, supra note 53, at 55.
EDWARDS, AMERICAN DEFAULT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF FDR, THE SUPREME COURT,
AND THE BATTLE OVER GOLD at 167 (quoting FDR).
99 JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT 99
(2010) (quoting draft speech).
100 See JACKSON, supra note 53, at 47.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 48 (quoting the president).
104 Id. at 48.
97
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Jackson conspired to violate the Constitution and federal criminal law.
The Constitution explicitly states, “No money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”105
Moreover, the Anti-Deficiency Act,106 passed in 1906, criminalized
expenditures made without a statute authorizing the expenditures.
Under this system, mere appropriation of funds is not enough. There
also must be a statute authorizing the specific expenditures.107
Jackson assisted the President in violating the Constitution and the
Anti-Deficiency Act, but he also advised that commencement of
construction would be a crime. At least he knew that the President was
aware of the legal problem. Apparently, in a jocular mood, the President
“[A]sked me if he was likely to go to jail as a result.”108 Jackson quipped
back, “I told him all that I could promise was to go to jail with him.”109
For Jackson, assisting the President’s criminal desire to commence
construction of the national airport was an easy decision. He even joked
about it. His decision was driven by a strong brew of loyalty, gratitude,
and a knowledge that the President’s plan would do no harm. Under
Hart’s model, the consequence of following the law would deprive the
nation of a national airport, which was significant but hardly involved
an existential threat. In contrast to the gain of having a national
airport, the negative consequences of violating the law were slight to
nonexistent. It was a no-harm, no-foul situation. In Jackson’s words, it
was an action that “invades no private right” and “took nobody’s
property.”110 Of course, whether Roosevelt made the right call in
weighing and balancing the consequences was a presidential decision.
Jackson understood the stakes, and these together with his immense
loyalty and gratitude led him to support his “[H]ero, friend, and
leader.”111 As a post hoc justification, Jackson later noted that without
the President’s “initiative, Washington probably would have faced
World War II without an adequate airport.”112
To be sure, Roosevelt blatantly usurped Congress’s constitutional
control over expenditures, but commencement of construction was
literally blatant. Everyone knew about it. The President essentially
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
Pub. L. 59-28, 59th Cong., sess. 1, 1906, 34 Stat. 49, 31 U.S.C. § 1341. Another
section provides that violation of the statute is a crime. 31 U.S.C. § 1350.
107 See Richard Rosen, Funding “Non-Traditional” Military Operations: The Alluring
Myth of Presidential Power of the Purse, 155 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1998).
108 See JACKSON, supra note 53, at 48.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 See note 53, supra and accompanying text.
112 See JACKSON, supra note 53, at 48.
105
106
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submitted his decision to the judgment of Congress and subjected
himself to any legislative repercussions. The openness of an unlawful
act is relevant to the morality of the act: “[I]ts main importance is its
linkage with submission to the operation of the law.”113 Although the
President usurped Congress’s power, Congress acquiesced. There was
no congressional complaint—no legislative backlash.
In addition to Jackson’s no-harm, no-foul analysis and the openness
of the President’s actions, other considerations may have and probably
did influence the President’s and Jackson’s decisions. For example,
before Roosevelt decided to act illegally, he spent many years trying to
persuade Congress to approve his plans for a modern airport.114 In
Jackson’s words, “He had tried to get Congress to move, but [the
matter] was bogged down by contests between different real estate
interests.”115 Roosevelt resorted to lawlessness only after a serious and
prolonged effort to comply with the Constitution.
Before leaving the National Airport episode, it should be noted that
in addition to conspiring to break the law, Jackson breached his oath of
office. He had sworn “to the best of my knowledge and ability, I will
support and defend the Constitution of the United States [;] I will bear
true faith and allegiance to the same; [and] I will well and faithfully
discharge the duties of [my] office.”116 We do not know how Jackson
viewed his breach, but if he viewed the violation as serious, he would
not have joked about it. He probably thought that his oath did not
change his fundamental no-harm, no-foul analysis—especially in a oneoff situation.117
C. Destroyers for Bases
In the summer of 1940, the triumphant German Wermacht swept all
before it, and Europe was in shambles. When the French surrendered,
Italy joined the war on Germany’s side. Great Britain then stood
alone118 with only the English Channel to defend it against the allSee GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 239. See also id. at 238–40.
For twelve years, Congress had been bogged down in a hopeless snarl of
commissions, resolutions, committee reports, charges of official misconduct, and even a
veto. See CASTO, supra note 11, at 22.
115 See JACKSON, supra note 53, at 47.
116 An Act to prescribe and oath, and for other purposes, 37th Cong., sess. 2, Ch. 128,
July 2, 1862, 12 Stat. 502, 5 U.S.C. § 3331. The President’s oath is much the same. U.S.
CONST. art. 11, § 1.
117 Cf. GREENAWALT, supra note 6, at 279–81.
118 But the British were not entirely alone. They also had their empire with countries
like India, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa. ALAN ALLPORT, BRITAIN AT
BAY 52–59 (2020).
113
114
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powerful Nazis. The British desperately needed destroyers to fend off
an anticipated invasion. The recently retired United States Chief of
Naval Operations explained, “In the narrow waters between England
and
the
Continent,
large
warships
cannot
operate
safely. . . . [Therefore,] [t]he British must depend in great measure upon
destroyers to guard their homes from war.”119
Throughout the summer, the British pleaded with President
Roosevelt time and again for fifty obsolescent destroyers that were in
active United States service.120 Roosevelt went back and forth in his
mind on whether to help the British in their hour of desperate need.
Finally, in August he decided to trade the fifty ships for valuable base
rights in the western Atlantic and Caribbean.
Churchill’s pleas for destroyers began in earnest in May of 1940.121
Roosevelt was initially dubious of the idea, and Jackson’s initial
informal legal advice was that there were significant legal
impediments.122 As the summer progressed, Roosevelt’s thinking
gradually changed, and by the middle of August he resolved to trade the
destroyers to the beleaguered British. There was, however, a problem.
The President did not have legal authority to sell a part of our Navy,
and Congress would not give it to him.
But the President decided to help the British anyway. Roosevelt
negotiated a very good deal for the destroyers: fifty old ships in
exchange for valuable base rights.123 The British did not especially like
this quid pro quo and objected that it was “a rather hard bargain.”124
Nevertheless, beggars can’t be choosers.
Jackson struggled to find a legal basis for selling off part of the
Navy. His first approach was to toss the hot potato to Admiral Harold
“Betty” Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations. An old, post-Civil War
statute authorized the Navy to strike ships “unfit for further service”

119 William Standley, “Adm. Standley Plea to Aid Britain,” Washington Post, Aug. 11,
1940, reprinted in 6 Vital Speeches of the Day 688. (text of Standley’s speech).
120 See, CASTO, supra note 11, at Ch. 5. For two good general treatments, see PHILIP
GOODHART, FIFTY SHIPS THAT SAVED THE WORLD (1965); ROBERT SHOGAN, HARD
BARGAIN: HOW FDR TWISTED CHURCHILL’S ARM, EVADED THE LAW, AND CHANGED THE
ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY (1995).
121 Winston S. Churchill to President Roosevelt, May 15, 1940, 2 CHURCHILL WAR
PAPERS 45–46 (M. Gilbert ed. 1995).
122 See BRUFF, supra note 37, at 247.
123 In addition, Roosevelt sought a pledge from the British that in the event the
Germans conquered the British Isles, Britain would send its fleets across the Atlantic to
continue the fight. See SHOGAN, supra note 120, BARGAIN at 204–05, 226–27.
124 KENNEDY TO HULL, FRUS 1940 vol. 3: 67–68. See generally SHOGAN, supra note 120,
at Ch. 10.
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from the Naval Register and then sell them.125 Jackson was preparing a
legal opinion to this effect, but Admiral Stark refused to make the
required finding of unfitness. The admiral insisted that “such an
opinion would be false else the British would not be so anxious to get
the same destroyers.”126 The admiral’s refusal torpedoed the deal and
left it dead in the water.
Jackson was dismayed. At this time, Earnest Cuneo, an American
attorney who served as a liaison between the federal government and
the British intelligence services, visited Jackson and “found him sad
and disturbed. He was off to a [cabinet or lunch] meeting where he had
to give the president very disappointing news: the transfer of the 50
destroyers to Britain was unconstitutional.”127
Cuneo told Jackson that unless he “reverse[d] himself [,] he’d be
asked for his resignation.”128 It did not help that Roosevelt told Jackson
the same thing. Unless he found a way out of this legal difficulty,
Jackson’s head “will have to fall.”129 Nonetheless, Jackson kept his
head. He came up with a frivolous statutory analysis purporting to
establish the President’s authority to sell the destroyers.
In desperately concocting a legal analysis to support his President,
Jackson might have argued that in national security matters the
President had constitutional authority to disregard otherwise
applicable statutes. Indeed, a near final draft opinion, provided “In view
of your constitutional power as Chief Executive and as Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy, many authorities hold that the Congress
could not by statute limit your authority in this respect [i.e., foreign
affairs and national security matters].”130 The draft immediately
continued, “I find it unnecessary, however, to pass upon that
question.”131
Someone—either Jackson or surely with Jackson’s knowledge—
struck this suggestion of an almost limitless constitutional power.
Instead, Jackson’s final public opinion relied upon a clearly erroneous

34 U.S.C. §§ 491–92 (1940).
JAMES LEUTZE, BARGAINING FOR SUPREMACY: ANGLO-AMERICAN NAVAL
COLLABORATION, 1937–1941, at 118 (1977) (quoting Stark).
127 Ernest Cuneo, “For the Record: Crusader to Intrepid,” 88, Ernest Cuneo Papers, box
111, FDR Library, Hyde Park, NY.
128 Id.
129 See CASTO, supra note 11, at 70. (quoting Roosevelt).
130 William Casto, Attorney General Robert Jackson’s Brief Encounter with the Notion
of Preclusive Presidential Power, 30 PACE L. REV. 364, 383–95 (2010) (reprinting the draft
opinion).
131 Id.
125
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interpretation of the applicable statute.132 A frivolous statutory
construction not subject to significant expansion is superior to a
limitless constitutional power.
In assessing Jackson’s frivolous statutory analysis, we should
frankly recognize that laws may be ambiguous. Moreover, the meaning
of an ambiguous statute may be difficult to ascertain. In this regard,
there is a respected strand of legal thought that no legal analysis can be
conclusively condemned as wrong.133 After a distinguished career in the
law, Kingman Brewster concluded “That every proposition is
arguable.”134 This analysis makes more theoretical sense than practical
sense. Pushed to its extreme, this legal nihilism destroys the project of
having laws to guide people.
The present essay is written on the assumption that under
traditional legal analysis, some legal arguments may be properly
rejected as simply contrary to law. At least, some legal arguments are
so weak that they should be dismissed as frivolous or clearly erroneous.
In the case of the national airport, any notion that federal funds
may be spent without prior congressional authorization should be
dismissed as frivolous. Similarly, we will see that Jackson, himself,
believed that the President’s wiretap program was illegal.135 Likewise,
Jackson’s opinion on the President’s technical authority to convey title
to the fifty destroyers was frivolous.136
In addition to loyalty, which never should be discounted, a number
of factors likely influenced Jackson’s decision to support his President.
Because a Nazi invasion was imminent, the British needed the
destroyers as soon as possible, but there was clear evidence that
seeking congressional approval would take an utterly unacceptable
amount of time.137 In President Jefferson’s words, no “time [was]

132 Acquisition of Naval and Air Bases in Exchange for Over-Age Destroyers, 39 OP.
ATT’Y GEN. 484 (1940) (Att’y Gen. R. Jackson). See CASTO, supra note 11, at Ch. 5 & 6.
133 See, e.g., the insightful comments of Professor Alice Ristroph in Is Law?
Constitutional Crisis and Existential Crisis, 25 CONST. COMM. 431 (2009). Similarly, in
the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Professor Abram Chayes noted that “in principle,
under the conventions of the American Legal System, no lawyer or collection of lawyers
can give a definitive opinion as to the legality of conduct in advance.” ABRAM CHAYES, THE
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 27 (1974).
134 DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 192 (2007) (quoting Brewster).
135 See notes 147–48, infra and accompany text.
136 See CASTO, supra note 11, at 71–73.
137 The British pleaded for immediate assistance. See CASTO, supra note 11, at 78–79.
Jackson understood, however, that congressional approval would take “six to eight
months.” JACKSON, REMINISCENCES at 877.
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allowed for a legal course.”138 In addition, President Roosevelt openly
announced the deal and submitted himself to the vicissitudes of
political blow back. Finally, insofar as congressional power over the
disposal of property was concerned, the destroyers deal was another noharm no-foul situation. President Roosevelt canvassed Congress and
found no serious opposition to his unilaterally making the deal without
formal congressional approval.139
About a decade later, Jackson justified the deal by weighing and
balancing the consequences. He “thought that Hitler’s government was
of such a nature that we couldn’t get along with it.”140 Moreover, if the
British were conquered, we would be “face to face with Hitler without
an ally.”141 He “hated the thought of war.”142 Nevertheless, “when it
came to offering aid to England, I didn’t have any difficulty.
Emotionally I hated it all, but it had to be done.”143
D. Wiretapping
Helping the President to violate the Anti-Deficiency Act and the
restrictions on the sale of destroyers were relatively easy political
decisions. When Jackson first became Attorney General, he faced a far
more difficult problem. In 1940, World War II was raging in Europe, but
the United States was technically neutral. President Roosevelt tilted
our neutrality as far as possible to favor Great Britain. As part of his
policy, the President sought to ferret out Nazi and Communist144 spies
in the United States.
Wiretapping was important in combatting espionage, but
wiretapping was illegal under the Communications Act of 1934.145 In
the context of a heated political controversy involving the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Jackson looked into the issue and
banned the FBI from wiretapping. Weak arguments could be made
sustaining the FBI’s power.146 For example, some advised Roosevelt
that the Constitution empowered the President to ignore the
Communications Act, but Jackson consciously rejected this nearly

See note 47, supra and accompanying text.
See CASTO, supra note 11, at 79.
140 JACKSON, REMINISCENCES at 877.
141 Id. at 913.
142 Id. at 912.
143 Id. at 914.
144 In 1940, the USSR and Germany were allied. See ROGER MOORHOUSE, THE DEVIL’S
ALLIANCE: HITLER’S PACT WITH STALIN, 1939–1941 (2014).
145 Pub. L. No. 416, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1940).
146 See CASTO, supra note 11, at 36–37.
138
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limitless argument.147 Like in the case of the destroyers-for-bases
deal,148 Jackson was leery of broad constitutional claims. Jackson
concluded—based upon two recent Supreme Court decisions149—that
the Act clearly outlawed government wiretapping. He never changed
his mind and restated his clear conclusion in the next year and the
early 1950s.150
Roosevelt, however, insisted on wiretapping. Jackson went “over the
situation carefully” with the President and presumably argued against
wiretapping.151 He advised that wiretapping was illegal, but the
President persisted. Jackson’s first approach to Roosevelt’s prerogative
decision was to adopt Fabian tactics of delay. He told Treasury
Secretary Morgenthau “that he was not going to do anything about
[renewing wiretapping] until after Congress goes home.”152
In addition, Jackson told the President that he would not engage in
wiretapping unless the President gave him a written directive to do
so.153 Unfortunately for Jackson, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover was
intent on renewing wiretapping and mounted an internal guerilla
campaign against Jackson’s ban.154 Finally, Hoover went to Treasury
Secretary Morgenthau and told him that he “desperately” needed the
ban lifted.155 Morgenthau relayed the message to the President, and
Roosevelt immediately replied, “Tell Bob Jackson to send for J. Edgar

147 Robert Jackson, “Attorney-Generalship” at 31, Robert H. Jackson papers, box 189,
folder 3.
148 See notes 121–23, supra and accompany text. Similarly, when Jackson advised
Roosevelt on constitutional authority to remove a director of the Tennessee Valley
Authority, he drastically deemphasized the president’s constitutional authority in the
public advisory opinion. See CASTO, supra note 11, at 20–22.
149 United States v. Nardone, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (Nardone I); Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338 (1937) (Nardone II).
150 See Robert Jackson to the Secretary of the Navy, June 9, 1941, 1 Supplemental
Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel 447–56 (1941), discussed in CASTO, supra note 11,
at 44; See JACKSON, supra note 53, at 68.
151 The next year, Roosevelt wanted Jackson to write an opinion that an obscure
provision of the Lend Lease Act was unconstitutional. See CASTO, supra note 11, at Ch. 9.
The two men “discussed [the issue] over and over,” and Jackson finally told the President,
I could not sponsor such an opinion. Robert H. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66
HARV. L. REV. 1353, 1355–56 (1955); JACKSON, REMINISCENCES at 916. In the end,
Roosevelt wrote his own legal opinion.
152 See CASTO, supra note 11, at 37 (Morgenthau quoting Jackson).
153 Id. at 37.
154 Id. at 35–37.
155 Id. at 35 (Morgenthau quoting Hoover).
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Hoover and order him to do it and a written memorandum will
follow.”156
Jackson agreed to supervise administration of the President’s
unlawful decision, but he did not like it.157 He later related, “I had not
liked this approach to the problem [because] wiretapping was a source
of real danger if it was not adequately supervised.”158 Quoting Oliver
Wendell Holmes, he said, “wiretapping is a dirty business.”159 Jackson
saw wiretapping as a significant civil rights issue and described the
President’s lawless decision as evidence that Roosevelt was not a
particularly “strong champion of so-called civil rights.”160 The
President’s decision was especially pernicious because the unlawful
program was secret and therefore not subject to effective political
review.
Although Jackson reconciled himself to facilitating the President’s
unlawful intrusion into his fellow Americans’ privacy, that does not
mean that he was content with his wrongdoing. Bernard Williams has
noted that even if an official, on balance, is satisfied with a decision to
harm others for consequential reasons, the problem does not vanish.
There
is
a
“moral
remainder,
[an]
uncancelled
moral
disagreeableness.”161
In Jackson’s case, he sought to rectify his misconduct through an
enduring effort to convince Congress to amend the wiretapping statute
so that the government had a limited authorization to wiretap. In a
sense, he was atoning for his sin.162 He was assuaging his moral
remainder. His efforts, however, were quite unrewarding. He related

Id. at 36 (President’s secretary quoting the President).
Senator Norris speculated that Jackson might resign. Raymond Clapper
memorandum, May 30, 1940, Raymond Clapper Papers, Library of Congress, box 81,
folder “May 1940”.
158 See JACKSON, supra note 53, at 68. Francis Biddle, who at the time was solicitor
general, later recalled, “Bob didn’t like it and not liking it, turned in over to Edgar Hoover
without himself passing on each case.” See BIDDLE, supra note 72, at 167. Hoover kept
two separate books on the illegal wire taps. He cleared some taps with Jackson, but he
conducted a large number of taps without Jackson’s knowledge. CASTO, ADVISING THE
PRESIDENT at 38.
159 JACKSON, REMINISCENCES at 967 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
470 (1928) (Holmes, J. dissenting)).
160 See JACKSON, supra note 53, at 68.
161 Bernard Williams, Politics and Moral Character, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY,
55, 63 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978). For a valuable elaboration, See WENDELL, supra
note 10, at 171–75.
162 See TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES?: A DEFENSE OF THE STANDARD
CONCEPTION OF THE LAWYER’S ROLE 149–50 (2009); See WENDELL, supra note 10, at 171–
75.
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that it was “an extremely unpleasant experience and caused me a great
many enemies.”163 He “was going down the middle of the road and being
shot from both directions.”164 The moral remainder of his misconduct
and the need to atone gave him the personal courage to persist in
walking his unpleasant path. Unfortunately, he never reached his
destination. In 1941, Roosevelt moved him from the attorney
generalship to the United States Supreme Court.
E. Resignation
When a high-level cabinet official like the Attorney General becomes
dissatisfied with the government’s actions, resignation or exit is a
theoretical alternative to voice within the administration. A high-level
officer might resign under protest or just simply resign.
As a historical fact, high-level officials almost never resign in
protest. The authors of a well-known study165 found that just seven
high-level officials resigned in protest during the period 1900 to 1969.
Given Jackson’s willingness to facilitate the President’s unlawful
projects, a resignation by him in protest is virtually inconceivable.
Nor does it appear that Jackson ever seriously considered a simple
resignation without protest.166 Because he exerted significant influence
over Roosevelt’s decisions, he was highly unlikely to resign. In addition,
his job was significantly different from high-level management
positions in private enterprise. In the private sector, an employee may
make a clean break by simply resigning and moving on to other
employment. After resigning, they would have little interest in the wellbeing of their erstwhile employer. Making a clean break with the
federal government is different. After a resignation, a cabinet officer
JACKSON, REMINISCENCES at 983.
Jackson, “Attorney-Generalship” at 33.
165 EDWARD WEISBAND & THOMAS FRANCK, RESIGNATION IN PROTEST: POLITICAL AND
ETHICAL CHOICES BETWEEN LOYALTY TO TEAM AND LOYALTY TO CONSCIENCE IN
AMERICAN PUBLIC LIVE (1975).
166 In May 1940, Jackson was extremely upset by one of Roosevelt’s fireside chats in
which the president warned the nation of a Fifth Column of Nazi and Communist
provocateurs and sympathizers who would attack our nation from within. See CASTO,
ADVISING THE PRESIDENT at 121–22. He told the president in private, “I am utterly
opposed to . . . persecuting or prosecuting aliens just because of alienage.” See note 74,
supra and accompanying text. In an interview with a respected reporter, Jackson “showed
real heat” and worried that antiunion interests might use the issue “to break down labor.”
Raymond Clapper, “Communism, Fifth Column Attorney General Robt Jackson,” May 27,
1940, Raymond Clapper Papers, box 9, folder 6, Library of Congress. He assured the
reporter, “I’m not going to stay here and do another Mitchell Palmer red raids. . . . I’ll quit
the job before I’ll do that.” Id.; See CASTO, supra note 11, at 121–22 (Palmer raids). In the
event, Roosevelt did not encourage attacks on possible Fifth Columnists.
163
164
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remains a citizen and continues to be interested in the public goods that
the government provides to them and others.167
There was also the matter of Jackson’s immense loyalty to his
President. At the end of Jackson’s first year as Attorney General,
Jackson was entirely dissatisfied with his position. He particularly
hated the administrative and political aspects of the job. He told a close
friend: “What is ahead is just plain damned disagreeable service.”168 He
even wrote, “I may at any time find it impossible to go on.”169 But
loyalty carried the day, “it simply was not possible to walk out on the
President, as long as he wanted me.”170
V. CONCLUSION
As a practical matter, the law does not provide a realistic legal
sanction against an attorney general who enters a criminal conspiracy
with the president. Michael Walzer has explained, that in these
situations “rules are broken for reasons of state, and no one provides
the punishment.”171 Practice seems to be consistent with Walzer’s
assumption. For example, in the case of our illegal torture program
under President George W. Bush, officials bent over backwards to avoid
sanctioning the attorneys who wrote a frivolous legal opinion to
facilitate unlawful torture.172
There are cogent political reasons for not punishing attorneys
general. Although a candidate in a hotly contested election might wildly
insist that his opponent should be sent to jail, this idea—without regard
to the legality of the opponent’s conduct—is utterly unacceptable. A
tradition that the winner in a presidential campaign should launch a
criminal investigation against the loser would be disastrous. In a
somewhat comparable situation, President Gerald Ford did the nation
an immense favor by pardoning former President Richard Nixon.173

167 See HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES at 102, 104–05.
168 Robert Jackson to George Neibank, Dec. 4, 1940, Jackson Papers, box 11, Neibank
folder.
169 Id.
170JACKSON, REMINISCENCES at 1081.
171 Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, at 179.
172 William Casto, Advising the President: Robert H. Jackson and the Problem of Dirty
Hands, 26 GEORGETOWN J. LEG. ETH. 183, 210–11 (2013).
173 At that time, I was appalled by the pardon. But in retrospect, President Ford did
the right thing. He spared the nation from continuing the Watergate chaos, and he
prevented the establishment of an unwise precedent.

2021

SERVING A LAWLESS PRESIDENT

881

These same considerations would be applicable to the prosecution of a
former attorney general.174
In theory, a lawless President and their lawless Attorney General
are subject to impeachment and removal from office. This possibility,
however, is at best remote. Emile Borel’s Infinite Monkey Theorem
comes to mind.175 In our history, only three Presidents were impeached,
and not one was removed. In this regard, there is a powerful nonconstitutional structural impediment to removal. In the Steel Seizure
Case, Justice Jackson noted that the President “heads a political system
as well as a legal system. Party loyalties and interests, sometimes more
binding than law, extend his effective control into branches of
government other than his own.”176 Since the impeachment of a
President or their Attorney General is inevitably political, it is
fortunate that in practice the two-thirds requirement for removal177
requires the assent of Senators from the President’s party.
Because in practice there are no legal sanctions against attorneys
general for misconduct in office, we should not be chary about passing
moral judgment on their actions. When Robert Jackson held that office,
he saw himself as “part of a team . . . and necessarily partisan.”178
Today’s Attorneys General operate much the same way but perhaps
with less restraint than Jackson demonstrated. In truth, the Attorney
General has become, more or less, one of the President’s many political
operatives. At least that is true of some. The attorney general simply
happens to be an attorney. Like any other political flack, the attorney
general is morally responsible for the president’s agenda that the
attorney general advocates and facilitates.
Outside of litigation,179 the coincidental fact that an attorney
general happens to be a lawyer serving a client should not restrain our
moral judgment. When Robert Jackson helped the President and future
Presidents violate the Communications Act and intrude upon his and
our citizens’ privacy, he did the wrong thing, and his misconduct should

174 If a President seeks indictment of his own Attorney General, these considerations
are not relevant.
175 Emile Borel, La Mécanique Statistique et Irréversibilité, 3 J. PHYS. THEO. APP. 189–
96 (1913). See also ARTHUR EDDINGTON, THE NATURE OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD 72 (1927).
176 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (concurring
opinion). See JACKSON, supra note 53, at 17.
177 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3.
178 See note 52, supra and accompanying text.
179 In litigation, an attorney’s actions are formally subject to other attorneys’
counteractions. In addition, litigation is subject to theoretically neutral arbitration by
judges and juries.
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be condemned. Likewise, when he helped send illegal aid to the British,
he did the right thing and should be praised.
President Jefferson understood that a President who acts unlawfully
should be subject to moral and political judgment. He must “throw
himself on the justice of his country and the rectitude of his motives.”180
A lawless attorney general should be subject to the same moral and
political judgment.
Each particular action by an attorney general should be assessed
using moral scales, but an overall assessment should be more forgiving.
As one of our great ethical thinkers once said, “He who is without sin
among you, let him first cast a stone at her.”181 Like all of us, Jackson
was a sinner, but our general judgment should be based upon his
overall conduct. In this latter sense, he was a good and honorable
Attorney General. The same cannot be said of all of his successors.

180
181

See Jefferson to Colvin, supra note 40 and accompanying text.
John 8:7 (King James).

